Evaluate The Following: “Nasser’s naive approach to world politics was a direct cause (more than other factors) of the 1956 Suez Crisis”
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s approach to politics can be interpreted as naive or genius. One of his main approaches to politics was to have the superpowers fight each other. This could be considered naive, because the attempt would be too transparent, or genius, because it would distract the superpowers from seeing what was going on under their nose. For example, by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, Nasser put the British, French, and Israelis on the offensive. Because of the invasion of the British, French, and Israelis, the United Nations passed resolutions to protect Egypt from the forces and to have the three nations withdraw. Later, the United States supported these resolutions, which could be considered a successful result of his plan. Nasser would later claim that he defeated the France, Britain, and Israel by himself, an attempt to anger the three nations, so they would attack each other, verbally, through sanctions, or with forces. Nasser was trying to implement his original strategy, but after discovering that it was not resulting in his desired outcome, he haulted communication with the United States, which Nasser was in communication with because they supported (did not oppose) Egypt, and, according to Said K. Aburish’s book Nasser, the Last Arab, Nasser’s policy of “playing the superpowers against each other came to an end.”
I disagree with the idea that Nasser’s polices were naive, but rather that he had a plan to bring down the superpowers. Whether or not Nasser’s policies are naive, his decisions can be considered the major cause of the 1956 Suez Crisis.
Evaluate the following claim, “The use of force, more than diplomacy or appeals to norms and values, ultimately determine the outcome of a dispute.”
The use of force may be an effective way to help finalize a dispute, but it does not ultimately determine the outcome of a dispute. When diplomacy and appeals to norms and values fails to achieve results, force becomes a plausible option that can get the job done (in an unknown amount of time). The old adage, you may have won the battle, but I won the war, further substantiates my point. Force may not always be the determining factor in deputes. The use of diplomatic sanctions, such as the refusal to conduct business with a nation, person, or peoples, can be effective as well. In modern times, North Korea would give up their nuclear program if all nations refused to trade with it and sell it oil for the winter. To sum up my point, the use of force, more than diplomacy or appeals to norms and values, DOES NOT ultimately determine the outcome of a dispute.
What rationale(s) did Arab leaders use in opposing the emergence of Israel? Were these reasons justified enough to warrant the use of force?
Arab leaders opposed the formation of a Jewish state. They used the rational of a victim to justify retaliation which, in my opinion, could have been diplomatic retaliation rather than force. To be able to give a good example of this, we need to step back and see an unrelated idea from viewpoint of the Arab. Imagine that you live in a country called Slokaxia. Slokaxia is a small country with great fertile land which you and your family have seeded and harvested for centuries. Soon though, a group of people immigrate to Slokaxia and start buying land. In thirty years they will own 10% of Slokaxian land and the native Slokaxians will own 90%. Imagine that the immigrants start saying this is our land and we want our own country here. A few Slokaxians don’t mind, but most do. The immigrants and the natives start battling. They also involve higher powers, who tend to side with them, and the United Nations, who decides to split up the Slokaxian land almost 50-50. You would feel angry, confused about how this could happen, and violated. If you replace the natives with Arabs, Slokaxia with Palestine, and immigrants with Jews, you will understand the rationale of the Arab’s disapproval and opposition to the emergence of a Jewish State. The moral question involved is, “does this reason warrant the use of force?” I don’t know. I am too close to the issue to make an objective decision. I do think that diplomatic actions could be taken, but that is not the question. So, does this warrant (justify) the use of force? I would say it does not justify the use of force, but I do understand why they would use force.
Evaluate the following, “After its all said and done, no single group, government, or institution is to blame for the manner in which the British Mandate of Palestine was partitioned.”
The UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee On Palestine) had the final say in history on the partitioning of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. When looking back on what could have happened, no one nation was to ‘blame’ exactly, but it is could have been partitioned differently. If the British did not change allies and sides so frequently, the Arabs, would have British support and get the majority of land and there would probably one Arab state with limited Jewish immigration. Also if Ernest Bevin did not give up on Palestine, it may not have been divided and may have stayed an Arab state. If President Roosevelt and President Truman let more refugees into the United States, there would not have been so much pressure for a Jewish Homeland in Palestine. In the end, President Truman pushed for the partitioning of Palestine. So, there wasn’t really one single nation to, blame for the results, but the United States and Britain greatly increased the viability that partitioning was the ideal option.
OPVL on ‘The Zionist Case: Golda Meir’
- Who: Golda Meir
- Where: Jerusalem (Before the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry
- When: March 25, 1946
- What: Golda Meir’s testimony to convince the major powers to support the development of a Jewish State
- Purpose: Golda Meir is trying to convince the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry that the Jews need a separate state
- Value: Allows us to see the original argument of Golda Meir for a Jewish state and the reasons why a Jewish State needs to be established
- Limitations: Golda Meir does not talk about the reason Palestine is the ideal place (besides that pioneers already chose it) and it is biased towards the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Golda Meir uses emotional appeal, so it is difficult to see the real facts behind the opionions. There is also no outline of what Golda Meir wants for the new state.
What responsibility, if any, did the international community have to the survivors / living victims of the Holocaust?
The International Community had the responsibility of providing care, the refugee status, home, and security. The victims of the Holocaust were denied entry to most countries because of quotas, but they needed refugee status. The international community was responsible for helping those who were refugees and IDPs because they were not helped before (to escape the razing). Also, the international community needed to help reconnect people with their families, which may have helped with the immigration. The International Community had these responsibilities , along with reassuring that this will never happen again, to the survivors / living victims of the Holocaust.
Consider the position of the British government on during the inter-war period. What were the consequences of the changing statements by the British government with respect to the emerging Arab-Israeli conflict?
The British betrayed the trust of the Arabs and, consequently, were put into a difficult position when the Arabs started fighting back. Before getting into the results, the preceding events will be analyzed. The McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915-6 was the first confirmed support for the Arabs. Sherif Hussein of Mecca believed that he had the support of the British because of the words exchanged. At the same time, Sir Mark Sykes, a member of the British Parliament, was having secret discussions with the French (more specifically, Charles François George-Picot) about the way the French and British would divide the land. The Arabs did not want the French in that land, as stated in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, and the Sykes-Picot Agreement would divide the land with the French; either the French or the Arabs would be let down. The British would betray either the French or the Arabs. The French are allies of the British and the land the Arabs had was necessary for the control of India. We would not know who the British would betray until the Balfour Declaration was written in 1917. This document stated that the British would back the Jews and support a Jewish state as long as it did not “prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in other countries.” The Balfour Declaration was the first official document written on behalf of the government. By the time the Arabs understood that the British had betrayed them, they started attacking anyone and everyone. In 1920, The British allowed the Zionist Organization, the Jewish National Fund, to purchase land in the region of Palestine. In 1920 and 1921, Arab attacks became increasingly apparent. In 1936, Arab Rebellions started to break out. For the years 1936-1939, the Arab Rebellions targeted British forces and occasionally Jews. The Arabs used violence and non-violent rebellious techniques. At one point, the British had to bring in 20,000 troops to quell the Arabs, some of who were forced into the violence.
What were the obstacles that prevented Arab political, economic, social, or other unity in terms of articulating Arab rights and interests in Palestine during the inter-war period?
During the inter-war period, the Arabs, were not able to unify to get their point across because of inexperience in European Politics and internal (within the area) struggles. Because the Zionists were more adept at European Politics, they were able to make cases against the Arabs and the Arabs, because of their inexperience, were unable to articulate responses or even retaliatory remarks. During the inter-war period, the Arabs were struggling and fighting against the British (mostly) and the Zionists (more rare). This internal struggle made it difficult for the Arabs to concentrate on articulating and realizing their interests.
What does Herzl mean by “the Jewish question”? Is there still a “Jewish question” today?
Theodor Herzl references, in an excerpt of Der Judenstaat, the ‘Jewish Question.‘ He does not reference it just once or twice, but rather it is a key component in Der Judenstaat. The ‘Jewish Question,’ according to Herzl, “is no more a social than religious [question]” and he also says that the Jewish Question will not be answered until it is answered on a political basis. When Herzl refers to the Jewish Question, I believe he is referring to a question posed in Genesis 3:13 “The Lord G-d called out to the man and said to him, ‘Where are you?’” If G-d knows all, why would he be asking Adam (the man) where he is. This poses a moral question similar to: where are you morally, spiritually, and physically. I believe Herzl is referencing this verse and is interpreting it to mean ‘where are we’ and ‘where should we be.’ The ‘Jewish Question’ revolves around the idea of “where are you” and that could be interpreted to mean on a mental, spiritual, ethical, moral, and/or physical level. If the ‘Jewish Question’ is “where are you,” then in modern times, it must have some meaning. By my interpretation of the ‘Jewish Question,’ the idea of ‘where are you’ is still an important one in today’s society and through out all time.