Oct
9
2009
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s approach to politics can be interpreted as naive or genius. One of his main approaches to politics was to have the superpowers fight each other. This could be considered naive, because the attempt would be too transparent, or genius, because it would distract the superpowers from seeing what was going on under their nose. For example, by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, Nasser put the British, French, and Israelis on the offensive. Because of the invasion of the British, French, and Israelis, the United Nations passed resolutions to protect Egypt from the forces and to have the three nations withdraw. Later, the United States supported these resolutions, which could be considered a successful result of his plan. Nasser would later claim that he defeated the France, Britain, and Israel by himself, an attempt to anger the three nations, so they would attack each other, verbally, through sanctions, or with forces. Nasser was trying to implement his original strategy, but after discovering that it was not resulting in his desired outcome, he haulted communication with the United States, which Nasser was in communication with because they supported (did not oppose) Egypt, and, according to Said K. Aburish’s book Nasser, the Last Arab, Nasser’s policy of “playing the superpowers against each other came to an end.”
I disagree with the idea that Nasser’s polices were naive, but rather that he had a plan to bring down the superpowers. Whether or not Nasser’s policies are naive, his decisions can be considered the major cause of the 1956 Suez Crisis.
no comments | tags: Arab Israeli Conflict, Arabs, British, French, Israelis, Journal, Nasser, U.S. | posted in Arab Israeli Conflict, Journal
Oct
2
2009
By giving us a new outlook on a certain situation, analytical tools become a quintessential tool to the decrypting of the world around us. Take for example any “crisis”. Analytical tools can help us go from knowing the states involved and the outcome to knowing the key players in the Situation. From this one step, we can further try to understand why the decisions were made. Taking biographical information of key players, getting personality traits, and psychoanalysis can help put us as historians in the mindset of the decision makers. By using these analytical tools, we begin to understand the “crisis” and, by also applying this different situations, analytical tools help us explain the complexities of the world around us. Also, we can start understanding the geography of the area, economical situations, and more complexities that involve the state. We then can examine the situation on a broader level, on the world level. What is the government (democracy? anarchy?)? What alliances does the area have? We can even examine the effects of the “conflict” on different nationalities, races, groups, communities, and individual. By using these tools, we can better understand the complexities of the world. We, by using analytical tools to understand the complexity of the world around us, can view the complexities from different angles and be able to understand, learn from, and explain all aspects behind the complexity.
no comments | tags: analysis, Journal | posted in Journal
Sep
25
2009
The use of force may be an effective way to help finalize a dispute, but it does not ultimately determine the outcome of a dispute. When diplomacy and appeals to norms and values fails to achieve results, force becomes a plausible option that can get the job done (in an unknown amount of time). The old adage, you may have won the battle, but I won the war, further substantiates my point. Force may not always be the determining factor in deputes. The use of diplomatic sanctions, such as the refusal to conduct business with a nation, person, or peoples, can be effective as well. In modern times, North Korea would give up their nuclear program if all nations refused to trade with it and sell it oil for the winter. To sum up my point, the use of force, more than diplomacy or appeals to norms and values, DOES NOT ultimately determine the outcome of a dispute.
no comments | tags: Arab Israeli Conflict, diplomacy, ethics, force, International Community, Journal, morals, North Korea | posted in Arab Israeli Conflict, Journal
Sep
22
2009
The UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee On Palestine) had the final say in history on the partitioning of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. When looking back on what could have happened, no one nation was to ‘blame’ exactly, but it is could have been partitioned differently. If the British did not change allies and sides so frequently, the Arabs, would have British support and get the majority of land and there would probably one Arab state with limited Jewish immigration. Also if Ernest Bevin did not give up on Palestine, it may not have been divided and may have stayed an Arab state. If President Roosevelt and President Truman let more refugees into the United States, there would not have been so much pressure for a Jewish Homeland in Palestine. In the end, President Truman pushed for the partitioning of Palestine. So, there wasn’t really one single nation to, blame for the results, but the United States and Britain greatly increased the viability that partitioning was the ideal option.
no comments | tags: American, Arab Israeli Conflict, Bevin, British, International Community, Journal, Roosevelt, Truman | posted in Arab Israeli Conflict, Journal
Sep
21
2009
The International Community had the responsibility of providing care, the refugee status, home, and security. The victims of the Holocaust were denied entry to most countries because of quotas, but they needed refugee status. The international community was responsible for helping those who were refugees and IDPs because they were not helped before (to escape the razing). Also, the international community needed to help reconnect people with their families, which may have helped with the immigration. The International Community had these responsibilities , along with reassuring that this will never happen again, to the survivors / living victims of the Holocaust.
no comments | tags: Arab Israeli Conflict, Holocaust, International Community, Journal, UN | posted in Arab Israeli Conflict, Journal
Sep
11
2009
The British betrayed the trust of the Arabs and, consequently, were put into a difficult position when the Arabs started fighting back. Before getting into the results, the preceding events will be analyzed. The McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915-6 was the first confirmed support for the Arabs. Sherif Hussein of Mecca believed that he had the support of the British because of the words exchanged. At the same time, Sir Mark Sykes, a member of the British Parliament, was having secret discussions with the French (more specifically, Charles François George-Picot) about the way the French and British would divide the land. The Arabs did not want the French in that land, as stated in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence, and the Sykes-Picot Agreement would divide the land with the French; either the French or the Arabs would be let down. The British would betray either the French or the Arabs. The French are allies of the British and the land the Arabs had was necessary for the control of India. We would not know who the British would betray until the Balfour Declaration was written in 1917. This document stated that the British would back the Jews and support a Jewish state as long as it did not “prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in other countries.” The Balfour Declaration was the first official document written on behalf of the government. By the time the Arabs understood that the British had betrayed them, they started attacking anyone and everyone. In 1920, The British allowed the Zionist Organization, the Jewish National Fund, to purchase land in the region of Palestine. In 1920 and 1921, Arab attacks became increasingly apparent. In 1936, Arab Rebellions started to break out. For the years 1936-1939, the Arab Rebellions targeted British forces and occasionally Jews. The Arabs used violence and non-violent rebellious techniques. At one point, the British had to bring in 20,000 troops to quell the Arabs, some of who were forced into the violence.
no comments | tags: Arab Israeli Conflict, British, inter-war, Journal | posted in Arab Israeli Conflict, Journal
Sep
10
2009
During the inter-war period, the Arabs, were not able to unify to get their point across because of inexperience in European Politics and internal (within the area) struggles. Because the Zionists were more adept at European Politics, they were able to make cases against the Arabs and the Arabs, because of their inexperience, were unable to articulate responses or even retaliatory remarks. During the inter-war period, the Arabs were struggling and fighting against the British (mostly) and the Zionists (more rare). This internal struggle made it difficult for the Arabs to concentrate on articulating and realizing their interests.
no comments | tags: Arab Israeli Conflict, Arabs, inter-war, Journal | posted in Arab Israeli Conflict, Journal
Sep
6
2009
Theodor Herzl references, in an excerpt of Der Judenstaat, the ‘Jewish Question.‘ He does not reference it just once or twice, but rather it is a key component in Der Judenstaat. The ‘Jewish Question,’ according to Herzl, “is no more a social than religious [question]” and he also says that the Jewish Question will not be answered until it is answered on a political basis. When Herzl refers to the Jewish Question, I believe he is referring to a question posed in Genesis 3:13 “The Lord G-d called out to the man and said to him, ‘Where are you?’” If G-d knows all, why would he be asking Adam (the man) where he is. This poses a moral question similar to: where are you morally, spiritually, and physically. I believe Herzl is referencing this verse and is interpreting it to mean ‘where are we’ and ‘where should we be.’ The ‘Jewish Question’ revolves around the idea of “where are you” and that could be interpreted to mean on a mental, spiritual, ethical, moral, and/or physical level. If the ‘Jewish Question’ is “where are you,” then in modern times, it must have some meaning. By my interpretation of the ‘Jewish Question,’ the idea of ‘where are you’ is still an important one in today’s society and through out all time.
no comments | tags: Arab Israeli Conflict, Journal | posted in Arab Israeli Conflict, Journal
Sep
3
2009
Nationalism played a major role in 19th century Palestine. An Arab nationalist program developed in response to persecution by the Ottomans and the influx of Zionists. Zionists came into the area known as Palestine for land, but they decided a place was needed for Jews due to rampant anti-semitism and by the encouragement of Europeans.
Sources: Our Class Discussion, A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict
no comments | tags: Arab Israeli Conflict, Journal | posted in Arab Israeli Conflict, Journal
Sep
1
2009
Imperial powers have a responsibility to minority groups under suzerainty that is no different when compared to majorities. Imperial powers have no responsibilities to the people under suzerainty. The imperial powers can allow the people to have liberties from freedom from interference in their countries affairs, to allowing them to vote in elections. They could also take away freedoms spanning from taking away their freedom, to forcing them to vacate, to killing them. Imperial powers have no responsibilities to autonomous territories and therefore have no responsibilities to minority groups under suzerainty.
no comments | tags: Arab Israeli Conflict, Journal | posted in Arab Israeli Conflict, Journal